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1 
Washington University 
Journal of Law & Policy 
Access to Justice:  
The Social Responsibility of Lawyers 
Introduction 
Karen Tokarz* 
A little over a decade ago, Washington University School of Law 
undertook an evaluation of the School’s Journal of Urban and 
Contemporary Law. The students and faculty adopted a new name for 
the Journal—the Journal of Law & Policy—and revised its mission. 
The new Journal was designed as a symposium-based publication, 
committed to bringing together communities of scholars through a 
mutual and collaborative student and faculty process; to emphasizing 
interdisciplinary and multi-cultural visions of the law; to exploring 
the implications of technology and the consequences of economic 
globalization; and to influencing law and social policy. 
Since the first volume of the new Washington University Journal 
of Law & Policy in fall 1999, the Journal has published a volume 
each year dedicated to Access to Justice. This volume marks the ninth 
annual Access to Justice volume published by the Journal of Law & 
Policy. 
 
 *  Charles Nagel Professor of Public Interest Law and Public Service, and Director of 
Clinical Education and Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs, Washington University 
School of Law. Professor Tokarz helps coordinate the School of Law Public Interest Law & 
Policy Speaker Series and teaches the seminar course that accompanies the series. Professor 
Tokarz wishes to thank Elizabeth Schlesinger, Editor-in-Chief, Washington University School 
of Law Journal of Law & Policy, for her invaluable assistance. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1 Tokarz book pages.doc  5/23/2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 25:1 
 
 
Like the prior eight volumes dedicated to Access to Justice, most 
of the Articles and Essays in this volume are written by presenters in 
the School of Law’s annual Public Interest Law & Policy Speaker 
Series, entitled “Access to Justice: The Social Responsibility of 
Lawyers.” These presenters are prominent academics, practitioners, 
and authors from diverse backgrounds in areas such as international 
human rights, the economics of poverty, racial justice, immigration, 
capital punishment, conflict resolution, clinical legal education, 
government public service, and pro bono private practice, who share 
a commitment to access to justice. 
The Public Interest Law & Policy Speaker Series was developed 
in 1998–99 in celebration of the School’s nationally recognized 
Clinical Education Program, through which many of our students are 
introduced to public service and public interest law practice. The 
Series informs the Washington University community and wider 
community on issues of justice through the presentations of the 
speakers (that are posted on the law school’s web site), through the 
Articles drawn from the presentations that are published in the 
Journal, and through the seminar course that accompanies the series 
in which students have the opportunity to meet with the speakers, 
read their work, and develop papers that focus on the speakers’ ideas. 
* * * * 
LUCAS GUTTENTAG—IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS IN THE COURTS AND 
CONGRESS: CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 
AFTER 9/11 
Lucas Guttentag, the National Director of the Immigrants’ Rights 
Project of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, is widely 
respected as one of the nations’ top immigration lawyers. He has 
litigated major immigrants’ rights cases, including regional and 
national class actions for almost twenty years. He has argued many 
cases in federal courts of appeals through the country and 
successfully argued cases in the U.S. Supreme Court, including I.N.S. 
v. St. Cyr and Calcano-Martinez v. I.N.S.  
In his Essay, Guttentag discusses immigrants’ rights and the 
changes they have undergone since September 11 with the goal of 
revealing some of the shortcomings of recent legislation. Because 
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post-September 11immigration legislation arose in a time of fear and 
hostility toward immigration and immigrants, Guttentag argues that 
the aftermath of September 11 cannot be ignored in assessing 
proposed immigration policy reform. Guttentag believes that 
September 11 was a watershed event that fundamentally altered the 
way the country thinks about immigration, and also exposed 
problems in the immigration system that long had festered with little 
attention. Guttentag argues that both the public and press began 
paying more attention to immigration policy following September 11. 
Guttentag believes that September 11 affected not just the general 
view of immigration, but also specific polices and practices, which in 
turn threaten the core constitutional rights of immigrants. First, he 
argues that many non-citizens were detained after September 11. 
Second, he points out that people of Arab and Muslim origin were 
overtly discriminated against. Third, he notes that the Administration 
closed deportation hearings to prevent the public from knowing 
where an immigrant was, how he was being detained, and when his 
hearing would be scheduled. Guttentag has been instrumental in 
challenging these closed hearings of First Amendment grounds, and 
the federal courts are divided on whether they are constitutional.  
Guttentag contends that the larger debate about American 
immigration policy reflects two longstanding and conflicting strands 
in America’s response to immigration. On one hand, Guttentag 
believes that we truly are a nation of immigrants, and that the United 
States is the most generous country in the world in welcoming 
newcomers. At the same time, Guttentag asserts that we are 
xenophobic and have a history of racism. Sometimes, one strand 
predominates, and sometimes it is the other, but neither ever 
disappears. Both, he argues, inform our immigration policy. The 
challenge, Guttentag believes, is to recognize both strands and work 
to better our immigration policy in light of these inclinations, 
especially in this time of fear and insecurity post-September 11. 
JOSEPH MARGULIES—MAKING SENSE OF CAMP DELTA 
 Joseph Margulies, Associate Clinical Professor at Northwestern 
University Law School, is the author of the recent book, Guantánamo 
and the Abuse of Presidential Power. In his book, Margulies traces 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the development of the detention system established in 2002 by the 
Bush Administration at Guantánamo Bay Naval Station in Cuba. He 
argues that Guantánamo was conceived of as “the ideal interrogation 
chamber,” and that it now contains many prisoners held without 
charges under super-maximum security conditions. As the lead 
attorney in the Supreme Court case, Rasul v. Bush, Margulies draws 
on first-hand experience to challenge the present operation of 
Guantánamo as a “prison beyond the law.”  
Margulies begins his Essay with an analysis of Guantánamo from 
the Administration’s perspective. According to Margulies, the 
Administration perceives September 11th as an intelligence failure 
and the Administration believes that an oppressive environment is 
necessary for interrogations to produce the type of intelligence 
sought. Margulies reveals and refutes three assumptions he believes 
are embedded in these positions. First, Margulies asserts that the 
Administration assumed that coercive interrogations in oppressive 
conditions were necessary to extract reliable intelligence, despite 
recommendations against the use of such coercive tactics from the 
FBI, the Military, Pentagon military planners, and the Judge 
Advocate Generals in every branch of the service. Second, Margulies 
suggests that the Administration assumed that the individuals 
subjected to these aggressive techniques actually possessed valuable 
intelligence, although no reliable screening existed and many 
detainees were found to possess no intelligence at all, let alone 
intelligence of significant value. Third, Margulies observes that 
oppressive conditions did not end when the interrogations were over. 
To Margulies, no moral justification remains for keeping prisoners in 
such sever conditions of confinement if they no longer are being 
interrogated.  
Margulies describes his feelings of hope at learning in June 2005 
that seventy percent of the prisoners on the base would be released, 
and most of the remaining thirty percent would be transferred to a 
new, medium security facility. Much to Margulies’ dismay, none of 
this ever came to pass. The mass release promised never took place, 
and a year later three prisoners committed suicide. Additionally, 
designs for the new facility were retooled to make it a super-
maximum security compound, more oppressive even than the 
maximum security conditions used before. The Administration, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/2
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Margulies tragically concludes, may hold prisoners in these 
conditions for the rest of their natural lives.  
LINDA GREENHOUSE—CHANGE AND CONTINUITY ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 
 Pulitzer-Prize winning author Linda Greenhouse has served as 
The New York Times Supreme Court correspondent since 1978, 
except for a brief period when she covered Congress in the 1980s. 
Ms. Greenhouse, who holds a Master of Studies in Law degree from 
Yale University, is the author of the recent book, Becoming Justice 
Blackmun: Harry Blackmun’s Supreme Court Journal. 
Greenhouse frames the discussion of Supreme Court politics in 
her Article around Justice Robert Jackson’s observation that “the 
Court influences appointees more consistently than appointees 
influence the court.” Though Jackson served on the Court for only 
thirteen years, his views changed greatly during this time. In an early, 
unpublished opinion regarding the actions of the wartime military 
commission, Jackson suggested that the Supreme Court should not 
have reviewed President Roosevelt’s exercise of his commander in 
chief authority. Ten years later, during the Korean War, Justice 
Jackson expressed a very different view of presidential authority, 
invalidating President Truman’s seizure of the steel mills. Viewing 
presidential authority at its peak when utilized in conjunction with 
Congressional authorization, Justice Jackson posited that “When the 
President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied 
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.”  
Greenhouse argues that Jackson’s transformation has several 
explanations. She notes that the former decision came shortly after 
Justice Jackson’s appointment, when Jackson still was closely linked 
to President Roosevelt. However, by the time of the latter steel 
seizure case, Jackson was a seasoned Supreme Court Justice who had 
seen, during his year at Nuremburg, the consequences of 
unchallenged executive power. His position in the latter case suggests 
that the institution and the life experience he gained while serving on 
the Court had changed him.  
Greenhouse cites other Justices whose personal politics evolved 
during their tenure on the Court, including Sandra Day O’Connor, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Clarence Thomas, and of course the focus of her research, Harry 
Blackmun. During his early years on the bench, Justice Blackmun’s 
votes rarely were surprising. By the mid-seventies however, his 
views, especially regarding the rights of the poor, began to change. 
Greenhouse argues that what changed Blackmun most was his 
assignment to write for the Court in Roe v. Wade. Although he 
merely represented the Court in penning the opinion, it nevertheless 
attached to him. Greenhouse suggests that, because of his deep 
involvement in Roe, the commercial speech claim in Bigelow v. 
Virginia caught his attention, resulting in an opinion Greenhouse 
believes is his most important doctrinal contribution.  
Although Blackmun himself denies that he changed very much 
while on the Court, Greenhouse presents statistics of his voting 
record that suggest the contrary. Beyond his involvement in Roe, 
Greenhouse points to Blackmun’s mid-career move to Washington, 
D.C. to explain his evolving perspective. Neither Blackmun nor 
O’Connor had any Washington experience before being named to the 
Court, and both traveled and lectured widely during their tenure on 
the Court. Greenhouse agrees with what other theorists have 
concluded—that appointees with prior Executive Branch experience 
change very little, while appointees form out-of-town change the 
most. Considering current Chief Justice Roberts’ prior experience as 
a White House and Justice Department lawyer, Greenhouse 
speculates that he may change very little while on the Court, while 
warning that predictions are as dangerous as they are irresistible.  
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN—BELL ATLANTIC V. TWOMBLY: HOW MOTIONS 
TO DISMISS BECOME (DISGUISED) SUMMARY JUDGMENTS 
Richard Epstein is the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service 
Professor of Law at The University of Chicago and the Peter and 
Kristen Bedford Senior Fellow at The Hoover Institute. A recognized 
antitrust expert and prolific writer, Professor Epstein has authored 
numerous books and articles on a wide-range of legal and 
interdisciplinary subjects. 
In his Article, Epstein discusses how and when a plaintiff’s case 
can be attacked for its legal or factual insufficiency. He argues that 
factual decisions are very complex and that discovery before a 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol25/iss1/2
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summary judgment motion can be highly expensive, especially in 
antitrust cases. To minimize these costs, all courts allow some 
judgments to be entered at the close of pleadings and before 
discovery. The recent Supreme Court decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly solidified protocol on this issue by requiring that a 
complaint contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.” Although Epstein welcomes the result of 
decision, he believes its reasoning is flawed and that, in reality, the 
case really is a disguised motion for summary judgment. Because, in 
Twombly, discovery would have supplied no new information of 
value, discovery was not needed. Therefore, Epstein argues, the 
proper principle is that courts should be more willing to enter final 
judgments at the close of the pleadings, especially where discovery is 
not likely to affect the outcome.  
The Twombly case is an antitrust suit that tests the relationship 
between the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Sherman Act. 
The plaintiffs in the district court case sought to use the Sherman Act 
to claim that the four major local exchange carriers colluded to block 
competitive entry within the industry. However, the plaintiff class 
alleged no direct evidence of agreement between the exchange 
carriers and relied instead on public facts to prove their claim. 
Because of the thin evidence presented, the case was dismissed for 
containing no specifics as to when the conspiracy was formed, or 
how it operated.  
That decision was reversed unanimously by the Second Circuit, 
but not on the ground that questions of fact could be raised only at the 
summary judgment stage. Instead, the Second Circuit did not rule out 
the possibility that a summary judgment motion could have proved 
relevant even after discovery. Writing for the Second Circuit, Judge 
Robert Sack invited Congress or the Supreme Court to weigh in on 
the potential abuses of discovery. When the Supreme Court did rule 
on Twombly, it spent much time addressing this issue, and then 
determined that heightened fact pleadings with more detailed 
specifics are unnecessary. According to the Court, all that is required 
for a sufficient pleading is “enough facts to state a claim to relief that 
is plausible on its face.” 
Epstein criticizes this decision on several grounds. First, Epstein 
notes that the level of pleading specificity required in Twombly is 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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barely distinguishable from the levels adopted in the examples given 
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Second, Epstein suggests that 
the apparent difference between “conceivable” and “plausible” is not 
only fuzzy, but bears no relationship to any of the specific language 
in the Federal Rules. Additionally, and in conclusion, Epstein argues 
that Twombly really is a mini-summary judgment case, conducted at 
the close of the pleadings, and not any real solution to the contested 
meanings of “plausible” and “conceivable.” 
WILLIAM E. KOVACIC—COMPETITION POLICY, CONSUMER 
PROTECTION, AND ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGE 
William E. Kovacic, E.K Gubin Professor of Government 
Contracts Law at George Washington University School of Law, is 
the chair of the Federal Trade Commission. He took a leave from his 
teaching position to join the federal agency as a commissioner in 
January 2006. He was the Commission’s General Counsel from 2001 
through 2004, and previously worked at the commission from 1979 
to 1983.  During his career, Kovacic has been an adviser on antitrust 
and consumer protection issues to the governments of Armenia, 
Benin, Egypt, El Salvador, Georgia, Guyana, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, 
Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Panama, Russia, Ukraine, Vietnam, and 
Zimbabwe. He also has authored or coauthored numerous books and 
articles on antitrust law, competition policy, and consumer 
protection. 
Kovacic begins by reflecting on his study of economics in the 
early 1970s and the improbability, at the time, that any of the events 
of the next thirty years could have transpired. Kovacic is certain that, 
as a student, he would have failed if he had predicted the eventual 
dissolution of the Soviet Union into independent, market oriented 
countries and eventual market reforms in China. Because of the near 
certainty at the time that such a scenario could not come to pass, 
Kovacic argues that the modern embrace of market-oriented reforms 
is one of the most remarkable stories of our time. In his Essay, 
Kovacic discusses how well-conceived competition policies can 
serve the poor and reduce barriers that reinforce economic 
disadvantage.  
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First, Kovacic identifies some of the phenomena that competition 
policy programs usefully can address to improve the welfare of 
economically disadvantaged populations. One important contribution 
of public policy to poverty reduction is the deterrence of supplier 
collusion in public procurement. Another example of an economic 
activity important to national prosperity are networks of 
transportation. Banking too effects prosperity by controlling the 
formation of new businesses, as unnecessary restrictions on entry into 
financial services harm owners especially of small businesses. 
Loosening regulations on entry into and participation in professional 
fields can help promote competition and expand the availability of 
important services, while relaxing incorporation and licensing 
requirements helps new businesses form to compete with government 
services already available, and tax policy favorable to new businesses 
helps such new ventures get off the ground. Additionally, 
technological innovations in communications have contributed 
greatly to the ease of doing business for all.  
Second, Kovacic describes how consumer protection programs 
can complement competition policy measures by punishing and 
deterring fraud. Developments in transportation and technology have 
made fraud schemes both quicker and easier to perpetrate, especially 
against economically disadvantaged populations. In this section, 
Kovacic argues that consumer protection authorities must continue to 
develop special programs to address fraud and other consumer 
protection concerns among these disadvantaged groups, such as 
education programs to assist poor populations in recognizing and 
reporting misconduct.  
In conclusion, Kovacic offers examples from his travels to reflect 
on the broader contributions to social welfare that competition and 
consumer protection programs can offer. In Vietnam, Kovacic 
explains that economic reforms have enabled many individuals to 
create small businesses, and now the carpet and garment weavers of 
the area have attracted a growing clientele of tourists and traders. In 
Egypt, Kovacic encountered furniture makers who began to trade 
with Israel after the reduction of regulatory obstacles. The business 
was entered into cautiously by both sides, but soon, the Egyptians 
reported, the Israelis went from being “the Jews to being our partners. 
. . . and our friends.” Kovacic uses this revelation to point out that as 
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consumers, when we are pleased with a product, we come to respect 
those who create it. As these positive encounters increase, Kovacic is 
sure that such respect will grow on both an individual and aggregate 
level.  
CONCLUSION 
This annual volume of the Journal, dedicated to Access to Justice, 
provides through the words and stories of real leaders a truly 
inspirational look at the social justice responsibilities and aspirations 
of lawyers to foster access to justice for all. 
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